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Résumé 
Le mouvement national algérien a un fort composant social depuis sa naissance dans les 
années 1920. Il se concrétise dans la question agraire. Au cours de la guerre de libération 
nationale, le composant social du programme du FLN s’approfondit insistant déjà non 
seulement sur l’anticolonialisme, mais l’anticapitalisme. (Exemples : Cuba, Yougoslavie.) 
Cette évolution aboutit à utiliser le terme « socialisme » pour la construction de la novelle 
société. Après l’explosion sociale en 1988, le FLN supprime le terme socialisme dans son 
programme, mais la structure sociétale reste sur place. L’islamisme populiste, force poli-
tique dominante entre 1988-1992, n’arrive pas à la détruire. Et le hirak, le libéralisme popu-
liste actuel y arrivera ? 
Keywords: Algérie, islamisme, option socialiste algérien, anticolonialisme 
The 1960s was the period of decolonization, the collapse of classical empires, and the Third 
World’s entry on stage. Colonies became independent and sovereign nation-states. They 
joined the international political scene as active participants significantly transforming the 
geopolitical map of the world, all within a single year. In 1960 sixteen countries in Africa 
gained independence. In one of them, in Belgian Congo, a severe crisis erupted, reflecting 
the contradictory ideological and political movements that permeated the continent. This 
crisis also demonstrated that the colonial powers did not refrain from violence, although 
they preferred peaceful ways in the resolution of conflicts. They attempted to form a new 
type of economic, financial, and cultural network of dependencies with their former colo-
nies, transplanting them into treaties. This system of the so-called neo-colonialist methods 
was first brought to light by the President of Ghana in his book published in 1965.1 
In order to avert the dangers of neo-colonialism, and in defence of national sovereignity, 
radical socio-political programmes were launched in several African states: the hallmark 
names are those of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sékou Touré in Guinea, Modibo Keita in 
Mali, and Nasser in Egypt. Even the professedly liberal Burgiba spoke of Destourian social-
ism in Tunesia. In Algeria, the FLN (Front de libération nationale), which orchestrated the 
national war of independence (1954–1962), also heralded the advent of socialism in the 
country. From the very beginning, it was the pronounced element of social fairness and 
                                               
1 (Krumah, Kwame) 1967. The volume has been translated into several languages. Many of its obser-
vations remain relevant to the present. The term neo-colonialism, however, has recently been replaced 
by the phrase soft power. 
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justice of Algerian nationalism that came to distinguish it from the nationalistic movements 
of other Arab states. 
The FLN passed a decision about the path of socialism at its Tripoli meeting in June 
1962. “Armed fights must be followed by ideological ones, as national independence 
movements will be followed by a national democratic revolution. The national democratic 
revolution means the conscious building of the country on the grounds of socialist princi-
ples and the power is in possession of the people.”2 
There was an earlier existing option to the document later to be named the Tripoli pro-
gramme: the Treaty of Evian of March 18, 1962, which marked the end of the war, and was 
signed by the French government and the representatives of the FLN. The Tripoli pro-
gramme mentioned above remarked about the treaty that it was “a neo-colonialist platform 
that France attempts to use as a foundation and framework of the new form of her rule.” 
The result would indeed have been that, had the points of the treaty been meticulously put 
into practice. This was also one of de Gaulle’s aims, as he explained in his memoires: “It 
contains everything we wanted it to contain. For the present, it means a ceasefire; for the 
future, a close-knit economic and financial partnership, and deeply embedded cultural and 
technological cooperation between France and Algeria.”3 
The socialist option, however, was not a mere child of the moment. Its proof may be 
found in the examination of the Algerian nationalist movement’s programmes and the offi-
cial news organ of the FLN: El Moudjahid. As Algeria was a primarily agrarian country, 
the social elements and content of the programmes were aimed at the betterment of the 
agricultural workers’ conditions. During the colonization of the country, Algerians were 
deprived of the best lands (almost 3 million hectares) and the land was given to the settlers 
who immigrated from Europe. On the lands that were owned by Europeans the average 
wheat production was more than eight hundred kilograms per hectare, while on the property 
of the Algerians the crop average did not reach five hundred kilograms per hectare. In case 
of a poor harvest or a long, cold winter, starvation hit the Algerian countryside, which often 
led to famishment.4 
The first agricultural reform plan was developed by the communist party as early as 
1925. It was based on classical communist-socialist principles: “the land belongs to those 
who cultivate it no matter what race or what religion they belong to.”5 The latifundia had to 
be nationalized and given over to the fellahs who were supposed to form cooperatives and 
to the peasants of European origin. 
Two years later at the anti-imperialist congress in Brussels the nationalist Messali Hadj 
defined the confiscation of large feudal estates, and the lands of settlers as well as capitalist 
companies, and their passing to the fellahs, as the primary demand of the Algerian people. 
The most important demand, of course, was national independence. He rejected the often-
heard accusations that the Algerian people did not have the talent to govern the independent 
Algeria themselves. Messali Hadj was the leader of the organization called the North-
                                               
2 Cf.: the programme in: Annaire de l’Afrique du Nord 1962. Paris: CNRS, 1963, pp. 638–704. 
3 (de Gaulle, Charles) 1972. p. 159. 
4 Barbé, René: La question de la terre en Algérie. Économie et Politique, 1955. 11. pp. 19–25. The 
population of Algeria was ten million in the middle of the 1950s, out of which one million was of 
European origin. 
5 Lutte sociale, March 22, 1925 
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African Star, which was founded with the support of French communists. Its membership 
was made up by North-Africans, mostly Algerians who worked in France. Messali Hadj 
later turned against the communists but kept his original social program.6 
The Great Depression of 1929–1933 affected the Algerians the most as they were the 
ones who lost their jobs first, their solvent demand diminished, and the land owners did not 
find markets for their products. The growing social tensions radicalized even the moderate 
nationalists, their program went through a considerable change. 
In 1943 “a great land reform that would erase the large feudal estates, which would en-
sure the right to welfare even for the enormous layer of the agrarian proletariat” was one of 
the central demands of the widely popular document entitled the Manifesto of the Algerian 
People, edited by the moderate nationalist Ferhat Abbas.7 The Francophile Ferhat Abbas 
had an especially strong opinion about the great landowner settlers (but not about the 
French in general!), which the representatives of the colonial authority were shocked to 
hear. “We are not Francophobe, we need them, we need their experts, but the great land-
owner settlers – the parasites – have to be annihilated. If we transform their property mod-
elled on the Russian cooperative villages, they will serve the interests of the community. 
We respect the French, but sooner or later we will have to get rid of the tyranny of the great 
landowner settlers.”8 
The social tensions that accumulated during World War II burst out. The celebration of 
the end of the war in May, 1945 led to a spontaneous, unorganized peasant uprising in the 
eastern part of the country. Brutal retribution followed, and the number of victims is esti-
mated to be 10-20 thousand.9 The most complex report listed the following causes for the 
social and political tensions: “it has to be noted that a lot of Muslims were in France as 
guest workers or soldiers, and they directed their attention to such social factors that their 
parents had not noticed. They were more sensitive to the propaganda of the press, the pam-
phlets, and the radio. They compare their situation to that of the Europeans, whom they 
considered privileged. They are envious of the great landowner settlers when they compare 
their own misery with the richness of the landowners. They demand the redistribution of 
land, they unveil the abuses of the landowners, which enable the privileged ones to be the 
overlords of thousands of hectares.”10 
The uprising clearly showed that the most important social problem of colonial Algeria 
was the agrarian question, which at the same time was also a national issue, because it was 
only possible to improve the situation of the peasants if Algeria achieved national indepen-
dence and eliminated the colonial system. After the repression of the uprising the parties 
that supported national independence did not simply want to establish a republic that would 
                                               
6 See: (Stora, Benjamin) 2010. 
7 (Collot, Claude – Henry, Jean-Robert). 1978. p. 164. 
8 Renseignements et études du Centre d’Information et d’Études, janvier 1943. Archives nationales 
d’outre-mer (Aix en Provence) 11H50. 
9 (Ainad Tabet, Redouane) 1987. 
10 Rapport à M. le Ministre plénipotentiaire gouverneur général de l’Algérie de la commission 
chargée de procéder à une enquête administrative sur les événements qui se sont déroulés dans le 
département de Constantine, le 8 mai et jours suivants. In Revue algérienne des scineces juridiques, 
économiques et politiques,1974. n°4. p. 310. 
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guarantee political rights, but wanted to establish a social republic that would guarantee 
material and cultural welfare for the individuals. 
In the November 1, 1954 manifesto of the FLN, the organisation that started the nation-
al liberation war, the principal demand was designated as “the creation of an independent, 
democratic and socially-minded state that rests on the principles of Islam.”11 
Concentrating on the land issue, the resolution of the FLN’s first congress (Soummam, 
August, 1956) was also phrased in this spirit: “The peasantry is convinced that their land 
hunger will only be satisfied with the achievement of national independence. A genuine 
land reform means terminating the poverty of the countryside: it is an act of patriotism and 
is inseparable from the total demolition of the colonial system.”12 
Numerous factors contributed to the foregrounding and strengthening of the social con-
tent within the FLN’s programme during the national liberation war. 
Slimane Chikh stresses in his excellent volume13 that from 1959, the FLN started to add 
depth to the social aspects of an independent Algeria’s society with the Constantine Plan.14 
The plan failed to reach its aim: it did not gather sufficient support among the Algerian 
populace. The FLN thus came to the conclusion that “an independent Algeria must not 
choose the capitalist model.”15 Nevertheless, it was the negotiations that had the most im-
portant effects on the deepening and refinement of the FLN’s social programme. During 
their course (1960-1962) the FLN was undoubtedly forced to make compromises, but it was 
always careful not to let Paris gain a strong nationalist stance and also prevented any single 
social group from gaining advantage from the scheme: instead, the positive effects were to 
be spread out over the widest possible groups of the nation. The “soldiers” would also put 
“the civilians”, the FLN’s delegation under considerable pressure to reach these results 
throughout negotiations. 
The National Council of the Algerian Revolution, the FLN’s supreme body corrobo-
rated the social and democratic content of the independent Algeria’s society at its August 
1961 session; democracy had to become real, a system under which people take control in 
their own hands. A land reform had to be carried out and social justice had to be given to 
the people who suffered most during colonial times. “The independent Algeria will not let 
neocolonialist structures form in the country as these invariably carry in themselves the 
infringement of sovereignty and thwart the free economic development of the nation,” reads 
the El Moudjahid’s article on the event.16 
The other important contributing factor to strengthening the line of social progress was 
“the practice of nations fighting for their independence,” stresses the above mentioned 
editorial. On studying the issues of El Moudjahid, it is clear that three countries were re-
ferred to: the People’s Republic of China, Yugoslavia, and Cuba. 
Beijing backed the FLN’s freedom fights from the very beginning. The Algerian delega-
tion visiting China in autumn 1960 gave high esteem to the results reached there in the 
struggle against backwardness. Ferhat Abbas, the leader of the delegation presumed that 
                                               
11 The Manifesto in: (Alleg, Henri) 1981. p. 510. 
12 El Moudjahid, 1956, No. 4 (numéro spécial) 
13 (Chikh, Slimane) 2006. 
14 De Gaulle’s programme for the betterment of the Algerian people, launched in the autumn of 1958. 
15 Le fiasco du libéralisme en Algérie. El Moudjahid, 1960. No. 72. 
16 Préparer l’avenir. El Moudjahid, 1961, No. 89. 
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certain measures could also be implemented in Algeria: “Quite naturally, China’s problems 
are specifically Chinese problems. Yet, in order for a nation to catch up with the developed 
West, with Europe, I do not see any other option but borrowing certain methods from China 
and the Soviet Union.”17 
The Yugoslavs were highly revered for the resistance they showed against the German 
occupiers during World War II, which the Algerians carefully studied before starting the 
uprising. It was only the Yugoslavs that knew about the preparations for the November 1, 
1954 uprising. The Yugoslav ambassador to Cairo was “the only European who was initi-
ated into the secrets of the November 1954 events.”18 Tito’s Yugoslavia, moreover, was 
respected for not belonging to any military-political blocs; it retained its independence. At 
the same time, they were respected both in the East and the West, and they could count on 
economic and military support from both blocs. “It is an example worth studying at length.”19 
During the war, El Moudjahid published the highest number of articles on Yugoslavia from 
among the socialist countries: nine in all, not counting the news reports, short or long. 
Cuba earned the admiration of the fighting Algeria because a small country as it was, it 
dared to stand up against the United States in defence of its sovereignty. “Fidel Castro is the 
man who could crush the economic prowess of the Yankees in the eyes of whole Latin 
America. He gave economic and political freedom to the island. Why then would it be im-
possible elsewhere?”20 In defence of freedom, Fidel Castro and the Cuban leaders ushered 
in a string of increasingly radical reforms that deeply transformed the structure of society. 
In the course of this, a land reform was introduced: “The land reform had to be carried out 
in Cuba because it was only in this way that the Cuban people could hope to gain real inde-
pendence. This meant serious fights with the retrograde forces without and within. But 
those are not invincible. They can be defeated. Cuba’s significance for Latin America and 
the whole Third World is the very fact that it proved that all countries, the small, the poor 
and the isolated, are capable of victory.”21 
In the Cuban example the FLN saw the organic links between the national and social 
factors that keep strengthening each other in the course of the national sovereignty fight. 
This is why it paid such close attention to the events in Cuba. Between July 1960 and 
March 1962 El Moudjahid published seven long analytical articles on Cuba. The titles them-
selves are quite telling: “Cuba, more than a revolutionary example (1960, No. 68); Cuba, a 
trade union solidarity front for Algeria (1960, No. 72); Let’s get to know the Cuban revolu-
tion (1961, No. 77); Cuba – a long fight against imperialism (1961, No. 80); Cuba: Year III 
of the revolution (1961, No. 83); Cuba – Year IV of the agrarian reform (1962, No. 90). 
The FLN saw the realisation of its own aims in the Cuban revolution. “This is no simple 
political change: it is a genuine national revolution, exclusively Cuban, or more like Latin 
American. Fidel and his movement may be called revolutionary nationalist” – thus El 
Moudjahid quoted Che Guevara.22 
                                               
17 El Moudjahid, 1960, No. 72. 
18 (Abbas, Ferhat) 1980, p. 263. 
19 La politique internationale des blocs et la guerre d’Algérie. El Moudjahid, 1958, No. 20. 
20 Cuba plus qu’une révolution, un exemple. El Moudjahid, 1960, No. 68. 
21 Cuba, An IV. La réforme agraire. El Moudjahid, 1962, No. 90. 
22 El Moudjahid, 1961, No. 77. 
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Guevara’s definition of the third world revolutions in the 1960s was excellent. In es-
sence they were nationalist revolutions, with the aim to create a sovereign nation state, 
which had been prevented by colonial imperialism. These revolutions had a very strong 
social component: they did not wish to give privileges to any layer of the society. 
These kinds of “nationalist socialisms” had numerous risks. Their bases were not solid, 
because they were born under the pressure of certain events (in Algeria’s case the liberation 
movement), which were not accompanied by intellectual reflections. They were character-
ized by spontaneity and intuition, and had a strong emotional content. They either got stuck 
at this level, and relying on certain elements of their culture and civilization they considered 
the theoretical problems of their socialism solved. The socialisms of the Arab countries be-
longed to this group. They have very often been denoted as Arab or Islamic socialism. How-
ever, it could also happen that they took the international experiences and examples into 
consideration, set aside intuition, and tried to formulate a socialist alternative based on a 
deeper analysis of the given society. Independent Algeria is a good example for both options. 
The period between 1962 and 1965, which has often been called the Ben Bella era after 
the president of the republic, was characterized by intuition and some kind of emotional 
verbalism. Every official document declared socialism and its Algerian speciality, the Arab-
Islamic characteristics. Ben Bella always emphasized that Islam was the religion of social 
equality. Even the local communists thought that it was possible to establish a socialist 
society with the Koran in one hand and The Capital in the other. Many people had similar 
views in the international communist movement. They thought that Algeria could become 
the Cuba of the African continent, the patriotic leadership of the country will more and 
more shift to the left and will get to the point when they will found a unified communist 
party that merged all the revolutionists. This, however, did not happen. In Algeria the na-
tionalist FLN created the unified organization in an authoritarian way without any prelim-
inary debates. Because of this, the new organization’s cohesiveness could only be super-
ficial. The Algerian communists dissolved their party, and its members “voluntarily”, but in 
fact on the “advice” of Moscow and without any grounded belief, entered the FLN, where 
they were stigmatized as atheists and were completely marginalized. This kind of authori-
tarian and bureaucratic method characterized the organization of the “socialist sector” in the 
economy as well. It, in fact, meant complete nationalization. (Even the ice-cream parlours 
were organized into the “socialist sector”.) Its natural consequence was, also due to the lack 
of professionals and experts, economic failure and bankruptcy.23 
Ben Bella’s emotional socialism attempt was ended by the Revolutionary Council on 
June 19, 1965, which was led by Bumedien.24 The new leadership declared the socialist 
option irreversible. It was not less authoritarian than the previous regime, but it eliminated 
intuition, expedience, and emotional exaltation. It did not outline its socialist framework 
instantly, only years later in the document entitled National Charter, which it opened to 
public debate that lasted for months. Then they took the critical remarks and recommen-
dations into consideration, made the necessary corrections, and then called for a referendum 
                                               
23 On the Ben Bella era, see: Algérie, pays révolutionnaire du tiers-monde. Démocratie nouvelle, juin 
1965, numéro spécial. 
24 On this day a military coup was carried out against which there was no opposition, except for a few 
hundred demonstrators. Ben Bela was imprisoned, or rather kept in house arrest far from Algiers until 
1980. 
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to confirm it. Algeria was the only Arab country where the program of the socialist option 
was worked out on such a wide-ranging social consultation. The Algerian new concept had 
three sources.25 Islam remained its first and foremost source. During the campaign for a 
referendum, the Islamists were especially active. They considered socialism equal to athe-
ism and argued that for that reason it could not be applied in Algeria. And if it could, then it 
could only be with a reference to its origins: “Arab” or “Islamic”. So, as a compromise, 
they accepted the denomination “specific socialism”. Its gist, however, was an Islam that 
“condemned racism, chauvinism, and the exploitation of people by other people”. The 
second source was the war of liberation, whose program, as I quoted it before, was not only 
national, but also social. The third source, which was very rarely formulated in the states 
that just started their process of nation building, was the experience of the universal devel-
opment of humanity and the “practice of world socialism”. 
After Bumedien’s death (1978), however, the socialist option started to fade, and it was 
the traditional concept of the Islamic component that gained ground. After the social explo-
sion of 1988 the extremist Islamists gained power, and in the irreversibilitiy of the socialist 
way was omitted from the 1989 constitution. The complete “privatization” of the society 
has not taken place (yet). The political practice is still characterized by social sensitivity, 
and the idea of social equality has not disappeared yet. The question is to what extent will 
Algeria transformed by the economic liberalism that is sweeping across the world and 
whether it will tear the national roots of social justice. 
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